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CHAPTER 3 
Security and Mortgages 
GEORGE P. DAVIS 
§3.1. Compensated surety. In the case of a noncompensated ac-
commodation surety where the principal and creditor without the 
surety's consent make a binding agreement to extend time, the surety 
is discharged unless the creditor in the extension agreement reserves 
his rights against the surety.l A compensated surety, however, is not 
entitled to invoke the strict defense rules governing a voluntary surety.2 
In Bayer & Mingolla Construction Co. v. Deschenes,8 the plaintiff 
Bayer was the general contractor on a state highway contract awarded 
on a unit price basis. The defendant Deschenes made a subcontract to 
do certain excavation in compliance with the prime contract which 
was incorporated by reference into the subcontract. Under the sub-
contract all work was to start not later than November 24, 1958. Work 
was in fact commenced on December 1, 1958. 
The subcontract required Deschenes to furnish a bond with surety 
satisfactory to the prime contractor in the sum of $91,000 "conditioned 
that Deschenes shall faithfully perform this subcontract and satisfy 
all claims and demands in connection with the· performance of the 
same." The subcontractor furnished a bond of Aetna Insurance Com-
pany. 
Bayer brought an action at law against Deschenes and Aetna for 
breach of contract and to recover on Aetna's bond. An auditor found 
that Bayer was entitled to recover from Deschenes and Aetna for the 
work that Bayer was required to do because of the breach of the sub-
contract. It was also found that any extensions of the completion date 
of the subcontract were by mutual agreement of the prime contractor 
and the subcontractor, that Aetna had knowledge that the completion 
date had been extended, that Aetna was not in any way damaged by 
Bayer's performing the balance of the work required by the subcon-
tract, that Bayer's delay in giving Aetna notice of the subcontractor's 
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§3.I. 1 Restatement of Security §129(1) (1941); see Brockton Savings Bank v. 
Shapiro, 311 Mass. 695, 702-704, 42 N.E.2d 826, 831-832 (1942). Cf. Northampton 
Institution for Savings v. Putnam, 313 Mass. 1,5-6,45 N.E.2d 936, 938 (1943)'. 
2 See Agoos Leather Cos. v. American Foreign Insurance Co., 342 Mass. 603, 608, 
174 N.E.2d 652. 655 (1961); Veneto v. McClosky Be Co., 333 Mass. 95, 104, 128 N.E.2d 
337. 342 (1955); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dunlap, 68 F.2d 289, 291 (Ist Cir. 1933). 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 357,205 N.E.2d 208. 
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default was not injurious to Aetna, and that on August 21, 1959, Aetna 
acknowledged Bayer's notice to it of Deschenes' default. 
Aetna contended that it was discharged as surety by the extensions 
of time for performance given by Bayer to Deschenes despite Aetna's 
knowledge of these extensions and the absence of any finding of injury 
to Aetna caused thereby. The Court ruled that Aetna as a compensated 
surety was not entitled to invoke the strict defense rules governing a 
voluntary surety. The Court pointed out that compensated sureties 
stand on a very different footing from voluntary ones. They are in 
effect insurers and ought not to be relieved from their obligations upon 
merely technical grounds not affecting substantially the character of 
the undertaking which they assumed.4 
The modern rule with respect to a compensated surety where an 
extension of time is given is that such a surety "is discharged only to 
the extent he is harmed by the extension."5 The federal courts have 
gone so far as to suggest that compensated sureties on performance 
bonds on building contracts contemplate that there will be delays in, 
and extension of time for, performance of the contract aI?-d thus im-
pliedly consent to them unless they expressly provide to the contrary 
in the bonds which they issue.6 The Supreme Judicial Court held that 
Aetna was not discharged as surety since it could not show that it had 
been harmed by the extensions of time, or by the prime contractor's 
failure to notify Aetna promptly of the default. 
Aetna also contended that a claim filed against the prime contractor 
and its surety should not have been allowed. The claim was filed more 
than 60 days but less than 90 days after the work in question had been 
done. The auditor found that the claim in question was not governed 
by the 60-day period for filing claims for the hire of dump trucks for 
common or contract carriers for use in the prosecution of the con-
tract.7 The Court held that the claim was governed by the 90-day 
limitationS for claims "for the rental or hire of vehicles" and "for 
labor performed." It held that Section 39A of General Laws, Chapter 
4 Home Indemnity Co. v. F. H. Donovan Painting Co., 325 F.2d 870, 873-874 (8th 
Cir. 1963). See Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Feutz, 182 F.2d 752, 756 
(8th Cir. 1950); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dunlap, 68 F.2d 289, 291 (1st Cir. 1933); 
11 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §6792 (1941); Restatement of Security 
§§82, Comment i, 129 (1941); Simpson, Suretyship 365 (1950); Stearns, Suretyship 
§§1.2, 6, 8 (5th ed. 1951); 4 Williston, Contracts §§1212A, 1222 (rev. ed. 1936). 
5 Restatement of Security §129(2) (1941). See Guaranty Co. v. Pressed Brick Co., 
191 U.S. 416,423-426,24 Sup. Ct. 142, 143-144,48 L. Ed. 242, 245-246 (1903); Phoenix 
Assur. Co. v. Buckner, 305 F.2d 54, 57-58 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Bruce 
Constr. Corp., 272 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1959); American Auto Ins. Co. v. United 
States, 269 F.2d 406, 408-409 (1st Cir. 1959); see also 11 Appleman, Insurance Law 
and Practice §§6796, 6848-6851 (1941); Annotation, 12 A.L.R. 382 (1921). Cf. Stearns, 
Suretyship §§6.8, 6.16-6.19 (5th ed. 1951). 
6 United States v. McMullen, 222 U.S. 460, 468-469, 32 Sup. Ct. 128, 130, 56 L. Ed. 
269,272 (1912); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. John R. Thompson Co., 88 F.2d 
825, 829 (8th Cir. 1937); Stearns, Suretyship §6.8 (5th ed. 1951). 
7 G.L., c. 30, §39A. 
8 Id., c. 149, §29. 
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30, and Section 29 of General Laws, Chapter 149, in respect to dump 
trucks seem to have, in part at least, overlapping coverage although 
Section 39A (unlike Section 29) extends to charges for such vehicles 
incurred by others than prime contractors and subcontractors. Section 
39A expressly states that the security required in accordance there-
with is in addition to the security required by former General Laws, 
Chapter 30, Section 39.9 
The Court held that because Section 39A provided security in ad-
dition to that required by the former Section 39 it should be inter-
preted as also providing security in addition to that provided by 
General Laws, Chapter 149, Section 29, although, as to persons pro-
tected by both sections, it is coextensive. 
The Court found no reason why a claimant who is within the scope 
of General Laws, Chapter 149, Section 29, and who complies with that 
section, should not have the benefit of the security thereby required, 
even if he does not comply with General Laws, Chapter 30, Section 
39A. Thus, as Quinn's claim under Section 29 was seasonably filed, it 
was immaterial that any claim which Quinn might have had under 
Section 39A was not seasonably filed. 
§3.2. Performance bonds. During the 1965 SURVEY year, the Su-
preme Judicial Court again considered rights and obligations under 
performance bonds. In Town of East Longmeadow v. Maryland 
Casualty Co.1 the town entered into a contract dated April 28, 1959, 
for the revaluation of real and personal property in East Longmeadow. 
The defendant was surety on a performance bond posted by National 
Associates, Inc. National delivered to the assessors approximately 2500 
to 3000 property record cards such as the contract required it to pre-
pare. The assessors reviewed from 200 to 300 of these cards and found 
errors and omissions thereon. The auditor found that the assessors 
were unable, by the use of the cards, to assess the properties listed 
thereon. Before the assessors reviewed the cards for accuracy they paid 
National four invoices totaling $7166.00. 
The lower court ruled that the contract provision for semimonthly 
payments "equivalent to the value of said work" placed upon the 
town some degree of reasonable diligence before making payment and 
granted the defendant's request to rule that when payment was made 
for each segment of the work submitted, that portion of the contract 
was completed and the plaintiff could thereafter neither sue National 
for breach of contract for that portion of the work paid for nor could 
it sue the surety on the bond. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the trial court 
and held that the contract was not divisible. The contract required 
the revaluation of the entire town by one appraising concern so that 
9 Section 39 was repealed by Acts of 1957, c. 682, §2, and the provisions of Chapter 
149, Section 29, were broadened by Acts of 1957, c. 682, §l, to supplant Chapter 30, 
Section 39, and to cover much the same ground. 
§3.2. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 505, 206 N.E.2d 54. 
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the appraisal could serve as a firm basis for uniform assessments. Fur-
thermore, the contract required National, if requested, to provide 
qualified persons to assist in explaining the system of revaluation to 
the property owners and also required that National assist in defend-
ing the values established by it in connection with applications for 
abatement and appeals. The town for its $21,500 was entitled to a 
single product, a single revaluation of all the property submitted by an 
appraising company who would be prepared and able to defend it. 
The town did not get this product. 
The Court held that the issue was thus narrowed to whether the 
obligee-surety relationship impliedly obligated the town not to make 
payments without checking National's performance as asserted in the 
invoices. The Court in effect held that when an expert is employed the 
client, in making payments, is entitled to assume that the work has 
been accurately done and is not obligated to check the work before 
making payment. The requirement for payment in accordance with 
value was based upon the assumption that the contract would ulti-
mately be completed so that in the case of a breach of contract and 
nonperformance, the obligor and surety company were not entitled to 
a credit for the work done. 
In Powers Regulator Co. v. Joseph Rugo, Inc.,2 the petitioner, 
Powers, by intervention in pending proceedings brought in the Superior 
Court, sought and obtained an adjudication of its rights as a subcontrac-
tor to be paid from the statutory bond given by the respondent, Rugo, 
under General Laws, Chapter 149, Section 29. Rugo was the general 
contractor for the construction of a hangar at Logan Airport for the 
Massachusetts Port Authority. Rugo had subcontracted work to one 
Shaw who in tum had subcontracted work to the petitioner, Powers. 
Rugo and the two sureties omits bond appealed from the final decree 
on the ground that the decree did not establish the indebtedness of 
Shaw to his sub-subcontractor Powers so that Rugo's rights against 
Shaw would be determinable. Shaw was a party to the proceedings and 
the final decree dismissed the petition as to Shaw without prejudice. 
The decree ruled that the sum of $4022.40 was owing to Powers from 
Rugo, with interest of $392.16, ordered Rugo to pay, and, in the event 
of Rugo's default, that the sureties do so. The sum of $4022.40 repre-
sented the 15 per cent retainage under the subcontract between Shaw 
and Powers. The remainder of the contract price had already been 
paid to Powers by Rugo. 
The Court stated that although the subcontractor Shaw was not an 
indispensable party, his presence in the proceedings was highly ad-
visable.8 The Court found that an appropriate final decree, assuming 
that the indebtedness of Shaw to Powers was shown by the evidence, 
would have been to the effect that Shaw was indebted to Powers in 
21964 Maas. Adv. Sh. 1897,202 N.E.2d 799. 
8 Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Joseph Rugo, Inc., 846 Mass. 206, 208, 190 N.E.2d 890, 
892 (1968). 
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the sum found, with interest, and that Rugo and the sureties were 
obligated to pay the sum if Shaw did not.4 
The answers of Shaw and Rugo, however, disclosed a suit brought 
by Shaw against Rugo to recover for the work done by Shaw and 
Shaw's subcontractors, and also disclosed the claim of Shaw that all 
work done by Powers after a certain date was done directly for Rugo 
under a contract with Rugo made after Shaw had been enjoined from 
entering the site of the work. The answers also revealed Shaw's asser-
tion that the decision in the other suit had credited Rugo with 
$22,793.60 as payments by Rugo to Powers for Shaw's account. This 
sum is 85 per cent of the contract price in the Shaw-Powers contract. 
In the circumstances of this other litigation between Rugo and Shaw, 
it was appropriate to adjudicate Powers' rights in the statutory security 
with no more concern with the Shaw-Rugo controversy than such ad-
judication required in the light of the facts established. 
The report of material facts showed that Rugo made a plumbing 
and heating subcontract with Shaw and that Shaw in turn contracted 
with Powers for the latter to install the temperature controls for 
$26,816. Powers began its work, temporarily delayed performance 
when it learned that Shaw had been enjoined from performing its 
contract with Rugo, but subsequently, at the request of Rugo, com-
pleted the temperature controls in the manner agreed upon in its 
contract with Shaw. Powers had been paid nothing by Shaw, but had 
been paid the contract price by Rugo less $4022.40 which represented 
the 15 per cent retainage provided for in the contract. It was also 
found that Powers had duly filed its sworn statement of claim under 
General Laws, Chapter 149, Section 29, and that Rugo was indebted 
to Powers in the sum of $4022.40 with interest from the date of demand. 
The findings and the decree do not expressly resolve the issue 
whether some of the $4022.40 was owed directly by Rugo. That, how-
ever, was inconsequential to Powers' right to recover from the se-
curity.1I The Court ruled that Rugo and its sureties were nevertheless 
entitled to a decree that would preserve any rights of Rugo against 
Shaw. It was also held not to be error to allow interest from the date 
of filing of the claim.6 
The Court concluded that the final decree should provide that any 
accounting between Rugo and Shaw hereafter made is to reflect the 
fact that Rugo and its sureties have by this decree become obligated 
to pay Powers for performing work originally specified to be done 
by Powers in its contract with Shaw. 
§3.3. Materialmen's liens. In N. W. Day Supply Co. v. Valenti,l 
4 See Carroll Hunnewell, Inc. v. Southboro Constr. Corp., 343 Mass. 667, 668, ISO 
N.E.2d 343, 344 (1962). 
(I Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Joseph Rugo, Inc., 346 Mass. 206, 209, 190 N.E.2d 890, 
892 (1963). 
6 Ibid. 
§11.3. 111411 F.2d 756 (1st Cir. 1965). 
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the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that although the 
Massachusetts statute2 in terms causes a lien to arise in favor of 
materialmen upon adjudication in bankruptcy of certain contractors, 
the statute was not effective to create a lien cognizable in bankruptcy 
when the bankruptcy adjudication had not previously existed. 
The court held that this was not a case of a right to perfect, after 
bankruptcy, a lien previously initiated or created,S but was merely an 
attempt to impose a special order of distribution upon the bankruptcy 
court after the rights of all parties had already been fixed by the filing 
of the bankruptcy petition. The statute purports to say that the filing 
of the bankruptcy petition creates the lien; and whatever may be 
the purposes of this statute, or its effect in other circumstances, it is 
plainly not within the exceptions permitted to a state to control the 
distribution of assets in the hands of the bankruptcy court.4 
§3.4. Retail installment sales of motor vehicles. In Pioneer Credit 
Corp. v. Commissioner of Banksl a bill in equity was brought for a 
declaratory decree to determine the rights of the plaintiff under Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 255B, Section 16, relating to the payment of re-
funds of finance charges under motor vehicle retail installment obliga-
tions paid in full before maturity. Section 16 provides in part: 
[A]ny buyer may pay in full at any time before maturity the debt 
of any retail installment contract, and in so paying such debt 
shall receive a refund credit thereon for such anticipation. The 
amount of such refund credit shall represent at least as great a 
proportion of the finance charge after deducting from such finance 
charge an acquisition cost of $12.50 as the sum of the periodic time 
balances after the day on which prepayment is made bears to the 
sum of all the periodic time balances under the schedule of in-
stallments in the original contract. Where the amount of the credit 
for anticipation of payment is less than $1.00, no refund need be 
made. [Emphasis supplied.] 
The Court first considered computation of the refund credit for 
fractional portions of a month. The bank commissioner had ruled 
that the words "after the day" as used in Section 16 mean that only 
full months can be charged against the buyer. The effect of this ruling 
was to give full credit for any partial month to the buyer. The plaintiff 
finance company argued that the credit should be prorated to cover 
the expired portion of the month. After studying the statutory history 
of Section 16, the Court upheld the position of the commissioner, stat-
ing that the $12.50 acquisition charge would compensate for any loss 
involved in not prorating monthly interest charges. 
The plaintiff also contended that the regulation, fees and examina-
2 G.L., c. 254, §31. 
S Bankruptcy Act §67(b), 11 U.S.C. §107(b) (1964). 
4 Commercial Credit Co., Inc. v. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54,56 (5th Cir. 1940). 
§3.4. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789,207 N.E.2d 51. 
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tions provided by General Laws, Chapter 2MB, are unconstitutionally 
discriminatory since banks compete with automobile finance companies 
but are exempt from the operation of the statute. The Court found no 
unconstitutional discrimination since banks are extensively regulated 
under other statutes. On the basis of this fact the legislature had a 
rational basis for distinguishing between banks and small loan licensees 
as to their presumptive fitness to operate in the motor vehicle financing 
business and could determine that banks need not be licensed under 
General Laws, Chapter 2MB, Section 2.2 The Court held that the 
licensing requirements of General Laws, Chapter 2MB, Section 2, as 
applied to the plaintiff, do not constitute "invidious discrimination," 
and are not "essentially arbitrary."s The statutory distinction between 
banks and others is based on differences that are reasonably related 
to the purposes of the act in which it is found.4 
§3.5. Mortgage bond indenture. In University Club v. National 
Shawmut Bank of Boston,l an incorporated club issued bonds secured 
by a second mortgage indenture with the defendant bank as trustee. 
The bonds matured on January 1, 1956, and were in default until 
August 3, 1962, when the club deposited with the trustee certain of the 
bonds and sufficient cash to pay all the outstanding indebtedness. At 
the time of this case, the trustee held approximately $35,000, which 
had not been claimed by bondholders. 
The trust indenture provided: 
... any moneys so deposited with the Trustee, and any moneys 
... held by the Trustee as the redemption price of Bonds called 
for redemption under section 2 of Article 9 hereof, remaining 
unclaimed by Bondholders for eight (8) years after said date on 
which the principal shall have become payable shall be repaid by 
and Trustee to the Club, and thereafter Bondholders shall be 
entitled to look only to the Club for the payment of their Bonds 
2 Rockland Atlas National Bank v. Murphy, 329 Mass. 755, 757, 110 N.E.2d 638, 
640 (1953); see Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 486-487, 86 N.E. 916, 918 
(1911), aU'd, 222 U.s. 225, 32 Sup. Ct. 74, 56 L. Ed. 175 (1911); Dewey v. Richardson, 
206 Mass. 430, 433, 92 N.E. 708, 709 (1910). The Court pointed out that the Pioneer 
Credit Corp. case is therefore unlike Hall-Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of 
Labor and Industries, 344 Mass. 695, 184 N.E.2d 344 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. 
Surv. l'4ass. Law §§10.5, 14.8, 18.56; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §IOA n.9, where it 
was held that there was nothing in the nature of the itinerant sale of baking goods 
to support the statutory requirement of a license to do business while at the same 
time the statute exempted similar businesses in dairy production from all such 
license requirements. 
S Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-464, 77 Sup. Ct. 1344, 1349, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485, 
1490-1491 (1957); see Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 617-618, 82 Sup. Ct. 
1297, 1304, 8 L. Ed. 2d 720, 728 (1962). 
4 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465, 77 Sup. Ct. 1344, 1350, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485, 1491 
(1957). See Hall-Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industries, 344 
Mass. 695, 700-701, 184 N.E.2d 344, 348 (1962). See also Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Public Health, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155, 162-163, 204 N.E.2d 281, 287, 
noted in §11.1 infra. 
§3.5. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1307, 202 N.E.2d 801. 
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and then only to the extent of the amount so repaid, and the Club 
shall not be liable for any interest on such amount and shall not 
be regarded as a trustee of such money. [Emphasis supplied.] 
On April 29, 1963, the club requested the bank to deliver to it all 
unclaimed funds. On January 1, 1964, the bank advised the club that 
it would not do so until August 3, 1970. The club contended that 
under the bond indenture the eight-year period commenced to run on 
January 1, 1956, and that payment of the unclaimed funds should be 
made to the club on January 1, 1964; but the trustee took the posi-
tion that the eight-year period commenced running only when funds 
became available to pay the bonds, and that, accordingly, it should not 
be required to pay the unclaimed money to the club until August 3, 
1970. 
The Court held that the eight-year period provided for in the bond 
indenture did not commence to run until funds were available to pay 
the bonds so that the trustee was not required to return unclaimed 
moneys to the club until August 3, 1970. 
§3.6. Statutory bonds. In construing bonds given pursuant to a 
statute, controlling weight is given to the language of the statute and 
to the intention and purpose of the statute rather than to the language 
actually used in the bond. In Sands, Taylor"" Wood Co. v. The Ameri-
can CO.,l a judgment by default was secured against Bowman and 
Bowman's Bakery, Inc. Bowman filed a petition to vacate the judg-
ment as to him individually, and, in connection therewith, filed a 
surety bond2 requiring that Bowman "shall within thirty (30) days 
after final judgment in aforesaid action pay ... [the plaintiffs] ... the 
amount, if any, which they shall recover." No petition was filed to 
vacate the judgment as to the corporate defendant, and the default 
judgment was allowed to stand as to the corporate defendant. At the 
trial on the merits, Bowman prevailed and no judgment was entered 
against Bowman individually. 
The plaintiff in this action contended that Bowman and his surety 
were liable on the bond because of the original default judgment 
against the corporate defendant. The plaintiff contended that the 
words of the bond requiring payment of "the amount, if any, which 
they shall recover" included the amount of a judgment recovered 
against any codefendant in the same action. 
The Court rejected this argument holding that statutory bonds 
should be construed to carry out statutory purposes.s The words of 
the bond requiring payment of "the amount, if any, which they shall 
recover" did not refer to the default judgment already recovered 
§5.6. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1111,209 N.E.2d 189. 
2 G.L., c. 250. §17; Fox v. Bottomly. 541 Mass. 701.703. 172 N.E.2d 255. 256 (1961); 
Davis v. National Life Ins. Co .• 187 Mass. 468. 470. 73 N.E. 658. 659 (1905). 
8 Martin Fireproofing Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co .• 346 Mass. 498. 500-501. 194 N.E.2d 
101. 102 (1963); Walsh Holyoke Steam Boiler Works, Inc. v. McCue. 289 Mass. 291. 
294-295. 194 N.E. 117. 118-119 (1935). 
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against the corporate codefendant who was a stranger to the proceed-
ings to vacate the judgment. 
§3. 7. Statutes. The 1965 legislature has passed a variety of acts 
relative to security and mortgages .. 
Chapter 265 of the Acts of 1965 makes it clear that the statutory 
limit of the liabilities of one person, partnership, association, trust, 
or corporation to a savings bank also applied to separate legal entities 
which are controlled by one such person, partnership, association, 
trust, or corporation. The statute somewhat liberalizes the method of 
computing maximum liability for purposes of the statute. 
Chapter 266 of the Acts of 1965 liberalizes the method of computing 
the maximum permissible liability on co-operative bank real estate 
mortgages. 
Chapter 356 of the Acts of 1965 provides that no person shall send 
out of the Commonwealth, or institute in a court of another state, any 
action upon a claim against a resident debtor of this Commonwealth 
with the intent of depriving such resident debtor of the benefit of 
the exemptions and protection accorded in Massachusetts to wage 
earners whose wages are in the hands of their employers, so long as 
such resident debtor and the employer holding such wages intended 
to be reached by such proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the 
Massachusetts courts. Any person violating this section is made liable 
in contract to the person from whom such claim was collected for the 
full amount of such claim, interest, and costs. 
Chapter 306 of the Acts of 1965 authorizes co-operative banks to 
grant 90 per cent mortgages on two-family dwellings. The statute 
previously permitted such loans only on one-family dwellings. 
Chapter 307 of the Acts of 1965 provides that co-operative bank 
mortgage loans may be made in excess of $30,000 subject to the 20 per 
cent limitation, provided that the amount of any such loan does not 
exceed 70 per cent of the value of the mortgaged property and pro-
vided further that no loan of this class shall be made or acquired in 
a sum in excess of 5 per cent of the aggregate amount of the guarantee 
fund, bad debt reserves, and surplus or of $30,000, whichever is greater. 
Chapter 308 of the Acts of 1965 provides that at least two members 
of the security committee of a co-operative bank must approve real 
estate offered as security for loans, but if the real estate is examined by 
one or more appraisers, it is no longer required by statute that at least 
one member of the security committee e:x:amine the real esta.te. 
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